Telescope Reviews: Null World

Definition is the act of predicating a subject. The predicate is the category into which the subject is assigned.

In the context of our discussion here I would like to add a few comments.

First, a subject can be predicated (categorized) without reference to any opposite of the subject. In order to define a thing all we need is the appropriate category to which the subject is assigned.

Second, there is a difference between opposite and privation. For example; darkness is the privation of light. One can make a room brighter by adding light. If darkness were an opposite, one would then make a room darker by adding darkness, which, of course, is not what happens. We make the room darker by decreasing the light in the room.

Third, a definition in which the subject is predicated of itself (e.g. A=A) is a special type of definition called a tautology. The unique feature of a tautology is that it is, at one and the same time, true and meaningless; meaningless in the the actual sense of the word meaninglessness, in that the predication of the subject adds no new information about the subject being predicated (categorized).

Fourth, only real things can be meaningfully discussed. This point was first made by the Greek metaphysician, Parmenides in the only fragment we have of his writings called the Proem. One could object to this Parmenidean idea by citing, for example, "Hobbits". For example, when Dr. Joe Cronin and I were editing the chapter on metaphysics in a book we co-authored one of us (I forget which) objected to the Parmenidean idea by sending an email to the other with one word "Hobbits". The meaning was, Hobbits aren't real but we seem to say a great many meaningful things about them. To this, one or the other of us responded that it was not Hobbits about which we said meaningful things, but the real world analogs used to describe Hobbits about which meaningful things were said; hairiness, caves, huts, eating three breakfastes, etc.

Fifth, there is an important difference between imagination and fantasy. Imagination can be used to display the essence of a thing being investigated. Fantasy, in the strict sense of fantasy (phantasm) cannot provide information which helps us display the essence of a subject being investigated. When one uses imagination one is using analogs from realities already meaninfully uncovered; hair, hairiness, shortness, cave, hut, magicians, reptiles, fire, gems, pride, hubris, ambition, etc. However, with fantasy (phantasms...things which have never existed in reality) nothing can be used to say anything useful about things as they are in the real world. Thus, though it might mean something to say George is like a Hobbit, it probably doesn't mean anything to say he is like a unicorn in Flatland. (x)~(x=x) seems to be a product of fantasy and not imagination; (x)~(x=x) is more like a unicorn in Flatland then it is like a Hobbit, or, using the words of the quantum physicist, Erwin Schrodinger, (x)~(x=x) seems to be much more like a winged lion than a triangular circle.

Sixth, (x)~(x=x) reminds me of the paraphrase of an idea by Frederich Nietzsche; "the only truth is that there is no truth". This statement is self-contradictory; it contradicts itself; i.e. "If it is true that "the only truth is that there is no truth", then the statement "the only truth is that there is no truth" is not true and therefore must be true." Which, of course, points out that the original statement is either wrong, meaningless, or both.

Seventh, having said that the self-contradiction is wrong or meaningless, is not the same as saying self-contradiction cannot be valuable. Hannah Arendt in her The Human Condition (page 104) used the example of the writings of Karl Marx to make this important point. She pointed out that Marx often contradicted himself. She used this as an opportunity to state that first rate thinkers often contradict themselves; whereas second rate thinkers rarely contradict themselves. The reason, it seems to me, is quite clear. First rate thinkers are most interested in displaying truth and are not concerned about making mistakes. Second rate thinkers are more concerned with approval and fitting in with the selected peer group; focusing more on avoiding contradiction then about doggedly searching after truth. Returning to Arendt, she then said that though the self contradictory statement lacked the ability in itself to display truth, it had a value in that it, the self-contradiction, could be used as a golden path to lead the dogged researcher to the heart of the first rate thinkers ideas. Thus, though (x)~(x=x) might not have any truth or meaning, it may lead to an understanding of the central thoughts, which may be very important and valuable, of the constellation of ideas of which (x)~(x=x)is one item only. Thus, I asked of Mike what it was about (x)~(x=x) he found interesting. There might be some real gold there.

Eighth, the difficulty I have thinking about and talking meaningfully about (x)~(x=x) reminds me of the statement that one of the difficulties we have about speaking about things like timelessness, eternity, and time travel is that we are constrained by using a "tensed" language; a language in which there are the tenses of present, past and future. Thinking and talking about timelessness and time travel using a tensed language is like trying to step on one's own shadow; it can't be done.

Otto